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Is the World Itself Fuzzy?
Physical Arguments for—and Unexpected
Computational Consequences of—Zadeh’s Vision
Vladik Kreinovich and Olga Kosheleva
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, Texas 79968, USA
vladik@utep.edu, olgak@utep.edu

Abstract. Fuzzy methodology has been invented to describe imprecise
(“fuzzy”) human statements about the world, statements that use imprecise words from natural language like “small” or ”large”. Usual applications of fuzzy techniques assume that the world itself is “crisp”,
that there are exact equations describing the world, and fuzziness of our
statements is caused by the incompleteness of our knowledge. But what
if the world itself is fuzzy? What if there is no perfect system of equations
describing the physical world – in the sense that no matter what system
of equations we try, there will always be cases when this system leads
to wrong predictions? This is not just a speculation: this idea is actually supported by many physicists. At ﬁrst glance, this is a pessimistic
idea: no matter how much we try, we will never be able to ﬁnd the the
Ultimate Theory of Everything. But it turns out that this idea also has
its optimistic aspects: namely, in this chapter, we show (somewhat unexpectedly), that if such a no-perfect-theory principle is true, then the
use of physical data can drastically enhance computations.

1

Fuzzy Techniques: The Original Zadeh’s Vision

Pre-Zadeh attitude: everything can be made precise. Scientists and engineers
use both formal languages and an imprecise natural language. In engineering
practice, formulas, derivations, and computations – which are described in a
precise language – intertwine with explanations – which are usually described
in a natural language. Even in formal mathematics, when presenting a proof, a
mathematician describes part of it in precise terms and part in imprecise terms
from a natural language: “one can easily see that”, “since ε is small, the diﬀerence
f (x + ε) − f (x) is also small”, etc.
In formal mathematics, usually, the imprecise parts can be reformulated in
precise terms; professional mathematicians can do it, mathematics students are
taught how to do it – and math students do not get good grades until they are
able to perform such a reformulation. In rare occasions, an attempt for such a
formalization reveals a gap in the proof, but in most such cases, this gap is later
ﬁlled.
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Similarly, when an engineer makes an imprecise argument, it does not necessarily mean that a more precise explanation is not possible: when needed,
an engineer can usually provide a precise quantitative justiﬁcation of his/her
original qualitative decision.
A similar precisiation is often possible beyond science and engineering. For
example, instructors who grade students’ work use seemingly imprecise words
like “excellent”, “good”, “satisfactory”. However, in most cases, these words have
a very precise meaning. In the US grading system, we usually add up well-deﬁned
points that the students got for diﬀerent problems on the test. If the resulting
grade is 90 (or higher) out of 100 possible points, we assign the grade “excellent”
(A). If the resulting grade is at least 80 but smaller than 90, we consider this
work “good” (grade B), etc.
Similarly, in medicine, many terms that are, at ﬁrst glance, imprecise, have a
very precise meaning. “High blood pressure” means upper blood pressure above
140, “fever” means temperature above 37.5 C, “overweight” means that the
body-mass index (body mass in kg divided by the squared height in meters) is
above 25, etc. In law, a child – a seemingly informal notion, with an imprecise
transition – is legally deﬁned as someone younger than 18 years old.
These example led scientists and engineers to conclude that in principle, all
the statements can be made precise. According to this belief, when a statement
sounds imprecise, it is only because we have not learned the corresponding terms
yet. Once we learn these terms, the statement will become very precise.
Zadeh’s vision. In 1965, Lotﬁ Zadeh published his revolutionary paper, in which
he emphasized that:
– in addition to situations when use imprecise terms but have a precise meaning in mind (“excellent test results” meaning 90+ points),
– there are also many situations when we use imprecise terms for which no
precise meaning is known.
Moreover, he showed that such situations, in which no precise meaning is known,
in which the meaning is “fuzzy”, are ubiquitous in many application areas.
To deal with such situations, L. Zadeh proposed techniques – which he called
fuzzy – that enable researchers to describe their imprecise statements in precise
mathematical terms, and thus, enables computer-based systems to process such
statements. These techniques has led to many successful applications; see, e.g.,
[3, 5, 6, 9, 16, 20, 22, 23].

2

Is the World Itself Fuzzy? And If Yes, What Are
Possible Physical and Computational Consequences?

Traditional viewpoint. The traditional viewpoint in engineering and science is
that the world itself is crisp, it is described by precise equations which, in principle, enable us to predict either the events themselves (in classical, pre-quantum
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physics) or probabilities of diﬀerent events (in quantum physics). The only reason for “fuzzy” uncertainty is that we only have partial knowledge about the
world.
For example, when a meteorologist makes a “fuzzy” statement that there is
a good chance of rain, the meteorologist usually believes that with more information, he/she would be able to make a more deﬁnite prediction.
But what if the world itself is fuzzy? But what if there are no ultimate equations?
What if, no matter what equations we formulate, no matter how accurate their
predictions are so far, there will always be cases when these equations will lead
to wrong predictions?
In other words, what if not only our knowledge is fuzzy, what if the world
itself is fuzzy?
Somewhat surprisingly, this is what many physicists actually believe. Many physicists indeed believe that every physical theory is approximate – no matter how
sophisticated a theory, no matter how accurate its current predictions, inevitably
new observations will surface which would require a modiﬁcation of this theory;
see, e.g., [2].
This belief can be justiﬁed by the history of physics: no matter how good a
physical theory, no matter how good its accordance with observations, eventually,
new observations appeared which were not fully consistent with the original
theory – and thus, a theory needed to be modiﬁed. For example, for several
centuries, Newtonian physics seems to explain all observable facts – until later,
quantum (and then relativistic) eﬀects were discovered which required changes
in physical theories.
At ﬁrst glance, this belief is pessimistic. This belief sounds pessimistic: no matter
how much we try, we will never ﬁnd the Ultimate Theory of Everything.
But maybe there is room for optimism. But is the situation indeed so pessimistic?
After all, physics is not just about ﬁnding equations. Finding equations is an
important ﬁrst step, but the ultimate goal of physics is not to ﬁnd equations,
but to predict future events – and equations are an important ﬁrst step towards
this prediction.
Many physical equations are very complex, solving them is a complex computational task. From this viewpoint, any possibility to enhance computations
would be a great optimistic development. For example, quantum physics is
clearly more pessimistic in terms of possibility of predictions, because in quantum physics, we can often only predict probabilities of future events, and not
the events themselves. On the other hand, research on quantum computing has
shown that the use of quantum eﬀects can drastically enhance computations;
see, e.g., [17].
How does the no-perfect-theory belief aﬀect computations? In this chapter, we
analyze how the no-perfect-theory belief aﬀects our computational abilities.
At ﬁrst glance, the fact that no theory is perfect seems to make the question of
computability rather hopeless: no matter how seriously we analyze computability
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within a given physical theory, eventually, this theory will turn out to be, strictly
speaking, false – and thus, our analysis of what is computable will have to be
redone.
In this chapter, we show, however, that in spite of this seeming hopelessness,
some important answers to the question of what is computable can be deduced
simply from the fact no physical theory is perfect – namely, in this case, we
show that computations can be enhanced in comparison with the usual (Turing
machine) computability.
Comment. Some preliminary results from this chapter ﬁrst appeared in [7, 8, 12,
25].

3

How to Describe, in Precise Terms, that No Physical
Theory Is Perfect

Discussion. The statement that no physical theory is perfect means that no
matter what physical theory we have, eventually there will be observations which
violate this theory. To formalize this statement, we need to formalize what are
observations and what is a theory.
What are observations? Each observation can be represented, in the computer,
as a sequence of 0s and 1s; actually, in many cases, the sensors already produce
the signal in the computer-readable form, as a sequence of 0s and 1s.
An exact description of each experiment can also be described in precise
terms, and thus, it will be represented in a computer as a sequence of 0s and 1s.
An experiment should specify how long we wait for the result; in this way, we
are guaranteed that we get the result. The coding should be done in such a way
that the waiting time does not exceed a polynomial of the length of the code
i; for example, if we want to wait for t moments of time, we should just add t
copies of an appropriate wait symbol.
In each experiment, we can specify which bit of the result we are interested in;
for convenience, we can consider producing diﬀerent bits as diﬀerent experiments.
Each such experiment is represented as a sequence of 0s and 1s; by appending
1 at the beginning of this sequence, we can view this sequence as a binary
expansion of a natural number i. This natural number will serve as the “code”
describing the experiment. For example, a sequence 001 is transformed into i =
10012 = 910 . (We need to append 1, because otherwise two diﬀerent sequences
001 and 01 will be represented by the same integer).
For natural numbers i which correspond to experiment descriptions, let ωi
denote the bit result of the experiment described by the code i.
Let us also deﬁne ωi for natural numbers i which do not correspond to a
syntactically correct description of experiments. For example, we can take ωi = 0
for such numbers i.
In these terms, all past and future observations form a (potentially) inﬁnite
sequence ω = ω1 ω2 . . . of 0s and 1s, ωi ∈ {0, 1}.
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What is a physical theory from the viewpoint of our problem: a set of sequences. A
physical theory may be very complex, but all we care about is which sequences
of observations ω are consistent with this theory and which are not. In other
words, for our purposes, we can identify a physical theory T with the set of all
sequences ω which are consistent with this theory.
Not every set of sequences corresponds to a physical theory: the set T must
be non-empty and deﬁnable. Not every set of sequences comes from a physical
theory. First, a physical theory must have at least one possible sequence of
observations, i.e., the set T must be non-empty.
Second, a theory – and thus, the corresponding set – must be described by a
ﬁnite sequence of symbols in an appropriate language. Sets which are uniquely
by (ﬁnite) formulas are known as deﬁnable. Thus, the set T must be deﬁnable.
Since at any moment of time, we only have ﬁnitely many observations, the set T
must be closed. Another property of a physical theory comes from the fact that
at any given moment of time, we only have ﬁnitely many observations, i.e., we
only observe ﬁnitely many bits. From this viewpoint, we say that observations
ω1 . . . ωn are consistent with the theory T if there is a continuing inﬁnite sequence
which is consistent with this theory, i.e., which belongs to the set T .
The only way to check whether an inﬁnite sequence ω = ω1 ω2 . . . is consistent
with the theory is to check that for every n, the sequences ω1 . . . ωn are consistent
with the theory T . In other words, we require that for every inﬁnite sequence
ω = ω1 ω2 . . .,
– if for every n, the sequence ω1 . . . ωn is consistent with the theory T , i.e., if
for every n, there exists a sequence ω (n) ∈ T which has the same ﬁrst n bits
(n)
as ω, i.e., for which ωi = ωi for all i = 1, . . . , n,
– then the sequence ω itself should be consistent with the theory, i.e., this
inﬁnite sequence should also belong to the set T .
From the mathematical viewpoint, we can say that the sequences ω (n) converge
to ω: ω (n) → ω (or, equivalently, lim ω (n) = ω), where convergence is understood
def

in terms of the usual metric on the set of all inﬁnite sequences d(ω, ω ′ ) =
′

def

2−N (ω,ω ) , where N (ω, ω ′ ) = max{k : ω1 . . . ωk = ω1′ . . . ωk′ }.
In general, if ω (m) → ω in the sense of this metric, this means that for every
(m)
(m)
n, there exists an integer ℓ such that for every m ≥ ℓ, we have ω1 . . . ωn =
(m)
ω1 . . . ωn . Thus, if ω
∈ T for all m, this means that for every n, a ﬁnite
sequence ω1 . . . ωn can be a part of an inﬁnite sequence which is consistent with
the theory T . In view of the above, this means that ω ∈ T .
In other words, if ω (m) → ω and ω (m) ∈ T for all m, then ω ∈ T . So, the
set T must contain all the limits of all its sequences. In topological terms, this
means that the set T must be closed.
A physical theory must be diﬀerent from a fact and hence, the set T must be
nowhere dense. The assumption that we are trying to formalize is that no matter
how many observations we have which conﬁrm a theory, there eventually will
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be a new observation which is inconsistent with this theory. In other words, for
every ﬁnite sequence ω1 . . . ωn which is consistent with the set T , there exists a
continuation of this sequence which does not belong to T . The opposite would
be if all the sequences which start with ω1 . . . ωn belong to T ; in this case, the
set T will be dense in this set. Thus, in mathematical terms, the statement that
every ﬁnite sequence which is consistent with T has a continuation which is not
consistent with T means that the set T is nowhere dense.
Resulting deﬁnition of a theory. By combining the above properties of a set T
which describes a physical theory, we arrive at the following deﬁnition.
Definition 1. By a physical theory, we mean a non-empty closed nowhere dense
deﬁnable set T .
Mathematical comment. To properly deﬁne what is deﬁnable, we need to have a
consistent formal deﬁnition of deﬁnability. In this chapter, we follow a natural
deﬁnition from [10, 11] – which is reproduced in Appendix A.
Formalization of the principle that no physical theory is perfect. In terms of the
above notations, the no-perfect-theory principle simply means that the inﬁnite
sequence ω (describing the results of actual observations) is not consistent with
any physical theory, i.e., that the sequence ω does not belong to any physical
theory T . Thus, we arrive at the following deﬁnition.
Definition 2. We say that an inﬁnite binary sequence ω is consistent with the
no-perfect-theory principle if the sequence ω does not belong to any physical
theory (in the sense of Deﬁnition 1).
Comment. Are there such sequences in the ﬁrst place? Our answer is yes. Indeed, by deﬁnition, we want a sequence which does not belong to a union of all
deﬁnable physical theories. Every physical theory is closed nowhere dense set.
Every deﬁnable set is deﬁned by a ﬁnite sequence of symbols, so there are no
more than countably many deﬁnable theories. Thus, the union of all deﬁnable
physical theories is contained in a union of countably many closed nowhere dense
sets. Such sets are knows as meager (or Baire ﬁrst category); it is known that
the set of all inﬁnite binary sequences is not meager. Thus, there are sequences
who do not belong to the above union – i.e., sequences which are consistent with
the no-perfect-theory principle; see, e.g., [4, 18].

4

How to Describe When Access to Physical Observations
Enhances Computability

How to describe general computations. Each computation is a solution to a welldeﬁned problem. As a result, each bit in the resulting answer satisﬁes a welldeﬁned mathematical property. All mathematical properties can be described,
e.g., in terms of Zermelo-Fraenkel theory ZF, the standard formalization of set
theory. For each resulting bit, we can formulate a property P which is true if and
only if this bit is equal to 1. In this sense, each bit in each computation result
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can be viewed as the truth value of some statement formulated in ZF. Thus, our
general ability to compute can be described as the ability to (at least partially)
compute the sequence of truth values of all statements from ZF.
All well-deﬁned statements from ZF can be numbered, e.g., in lexicographic
order. Let αn denote the truth value of the n-th ZF statement, and let α =
α1 . . . αn . . . denote the inﬁnite sequence formed by these truth values. In terms
of this sequence, our ability to compute is our ability to compute the sequence α.
Kolmogorov complexity as a way to describe what is easier to compute. We want
to analyze whether the use of physical observations (i.e., of the sequence ω
analyzed in the previous section) can simplify computations. A natural measure
of easiness-to-compute was invented by A. N. Kolmogorov, the founder of modern
probability theory, when he realized that in the traditional probability theory,
there is no formal way to distinguish between:
– ﬁnite sequences which come from observing from truly random processes,
and
– orderly sequences like 0101 . . . 01.
Kolmogorov noticed that an orderly sequence 0101 . . . 01 can be computed by a
short program, while the only way to compute a truly random sequence 0101 . . .
is to have a print statement that prints this sequence. He suggested to describe
this diﬀerence by introducing what is now known as Kolmogorov complexity K(x)
of a ﬁnite sequence x: the shortest length of a program (in some programming
language) which computes the sequence x.
– For an orderly sequence x, the Kolmogorov complexity K(x) is much smaller
than the length len(x) of this sequence: K(x) ≪ len(x).
– For a truly random sequence x, we have K(x) ≈ len(x); see, e.g., [14].
The smaller the diﬀerence len(x) − K(x), the more we are sure that the sequence
x is truly random.
Relative Kolmogorov complexity as a way to describe when using an auxiliary
sequence simpliﬁes computations. The usual notion of Kolmogorov complexity
provides the complexity of computing x “from scratch”. A similar notion of the
relative Kolmogorov complexity K(x | y) can be used to describe the complexity
of computing x when a (potentially inﬁnite) sequence y is given. This relative
complexity is based on programs which are allowed to use y as a subroutine, i.e.,
programs which, after generating an integer n, can get the n-th bit yn of the
sequence y by simply calling y. When we compute the length of such programs,
we just count the length of the parameters of this call, not the length of the
auxiliary program which computes yn – just like when we count the length of
a C++ program, we do not count how many steps it takes to compute, e.g.,
sin(x), we just count the number of symbols in this function call. The relative
Kolmogorov complexity is then deﬁned as the shortest length of such a y-using
program which computes x.
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Clearly, if x and y are unrelated, having access to y does not help in computing x, so K(x | y) ≈ K(x). On the other hand, if x coincides with y, then
the relative complexity K(x | y) is very small: all we need is a simple for-loop, in
which we call for each bit yi , i = 1, . . . , n, and print this bit right away.
Resulting reformulation of our question. In terms of relative Kolmogorov complexity, the question of whether observations enhance computations is translated
into checking whether K(α1 . . . αn | ω) ≈ K(α1 . . . αn ) (in which case there is no
enhancement) or whether K(α1 . . . αn | ω) ≪ K(α1 . . . αn ) (in which case there is
a strong enhancement). The larger the diﬀerence K(α1 . . . αn )−K(α1 . . . αn | ω),
the larger the enhancement.

5

First Result: No-Perfect-Theory Principle Enhances
Computability

Let us show that under the no-perfect-theory principle, observations do indeed
enhance computability.
Proposition 1. Let α be a sequence of truth values of ZF statements, and let
ω be an inﬁnite binary sequence which is consistent with the no-perfect-theory
principle. Then, for every integer C > 0, there exists an integer n for which
K(α1 . . . αn | ω) < K(α1 . . . αn ) − C.
In other words, in principle, we can have an arbitrary large enhancement.
Comment. For readers’ convenience, all the proof are placed in a special appendix.

6

Can Access to Physical Observations Speed Up
Computations?

Are computations feasible? What we have shown so far is that under Zadehinspired no-perfect-theory belief, it is possible to compute things that are not
computable in the usual physical paradigm. From the practical viewpoint, being
able to compute something in principle is important, but even more important
is how fast we can compute it. In many cases, computations are theoretically
possible, but not practically feasible, since they require computation times which
are longer than the lifetime of the Universe :-( It is therefore important to analyze
which problems are feasibly computable and which are not. To perform this
analysis, we need to deﬁne what is “feasible” and what is a “problem”.
In computer science, “feasible” is usually interpreted as computable in polynomial time, i.e., in time t bounded by a polynomial of the length n of the input;
see, e.g., [19]. This deﬁnition works in most cases:
– time 2n is non-feasible already for n ≈ 300, while
– time n2 or n3 is usually feasible.
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This is not a perfect deﬁnition:
– on the one hand, time t = 10400 ·n is polynomial in n but clearly not feasible;
– on the other hand, computation time exp(10−10 · n) is not bounded by a
polynomial, but it clearly corresponds to feasible computations.
However, this is the best deﬁnition we have.
By a problem, computer scientists usually understand a problem in which it
is absolutely clear what is a solution and what is not. For example:
– ﬁnding a proof of a given mathematical statement,
– ﬁnding a formula that ﬁts all experimental observations,
– designing a bridge under certain speciﬁcations of strength, cost, etc.,
these are all such problems – while, e.g., the problem of designing a beautiful
bridge is not clearly deﬁned.
In general, we need to ﬁnd a solution that satisﬁes a given set of constraints
– or at least check that such a solution is possible. Once we have a candidate
for the solution, we can feasibly check whether this candidate indeed satisﬁes all
the constraints.
A problem of checking whether a given set of constraints has solution is called
a problem of the class NP if we can check, in polynomial time, whether a given
candidate is a solution; see, e.g., [19].
Examples of such problem includes checking whether a given graph can be
colored in 3 colors, checking whether a given propositional formula – i.e., formula
of the type
(v1 ∨ ¬v2 ∨ v3 ) & (v4 ∨ ¬v2 ∨ ¬v5 ) & . . . ,
is satisﬁable, i.e., whether this formula is true by some combination of the propositional variables vi , etc.
Each problem from the class NP can be algorithmically solved by trying
all possible candidates. For example, we can check whether a graph can be
colored by trying all possible assignments of colors to diﬀerent vertices of a
graph, and we can check whether a given propositional formula is satisﬁable
by trying all 2n possible combinations of true-or-false values v1 , . . . , vn . Such
exhaustive search algorithms require computation time like 2n , time that grows
exponentially with n. For medium-size inputs, e.g., for n ≈ 300, the resulting
time is larger than the lifetime of the Universe. So, these exhaustive search
algorithms are not practically feasible.
It is not known whether problems from the class NP can be solved feasibly
?
(i.e., in polynomial time): this is the famous open problem P=NP. It is known,
however, there are problems in the class NP which are NP-complete in the sense
that every problem from the class NP can be reduced to this problem. Reduction
means, in particular, that if we can ﬁnd a way to eﬃciently solve one NPcomplete problem, then, by reducing other problems from the class NP to this
problem, we can thus eﬃciently solve all the problems from the class NP.
So, it is very important to be able to eﬃciently solve even one NP-hard
problem. (By the way, both above example of NP problems – checking whether
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a graph can be colored in 3 colors and whether coloring a propositional formula
is satisﬁable – are NP-complete.)
Can the use of non-standard physics speed up the solution of NP-complete problems? NP-completeness of a problem means, crudely speaking, that the problem
may take an unrealistically long time to solve – at least on computers based on
the usual physical techniques. A natural question is: can the use of non-standard
physics speed up the solution of these problems?
This question has been analyzed for several speciﬁc physical theories, e.g., for
quantum ﬁled theory, for cosmological solutions with wormholes and/or casual
anomalies. Several possible techniques for solving NP-complete problems are
described in [1, 11, 13, 15, 21].
How does the no-perfect-belief aﬀect the speed of computations? In this chapter,
we show that an important speed-up can be deduced simply from the fact no
physical theory is perfect.

7

Second Result: The Use of Physical Observations Can
Help in Solving NP-Complete Problems

How to represent instances of an NP-complete problem. For each NP-complete
problem P, its instances are sequences of symbols. In the computer, each such
sequence is represented as a sequence of 0s and 1s. Thus, as in the previous
sections, we can append 1 in front of this sequence and interpret the resulting
sequence as a binary code of a natural number i.
In principle, not all natural numbers i correspond to instances of a problem P;
we will denote the set of all natural numbers which correspond to such instances
by SP .
For each i ∈ SP , the correct answer (true or false) to the i-th instance of the
problem P will be denoted by sP,i .
What we mean by using physical observations in computations. In addition to
performing computations, our computational device can produce a scheme i for
an experiment, and then use the result ωi of this experiment in future computations. In other words, given an integer i, we can produce ωi .
In precise theory-of-computation terms, the use of physical observations in
computations thus means computations that use the sequence ω as an oracle;
see, e.g., [19].
Definition 3. By a ph-algorithm A, we mean an algorithm which uses, as an
oracle, a sequence ω which is consistent with the no-perfect-theory principle.
Notation. The result of applying an algorithm A using ω to an input i will be
denoted by A(ω, i).
Definition 4. Let P be an NP-complete problem. We say that a feasible phalgorithm A solves almost all instances of P if for every ε > 0, and for every
natural number n, there exists an integer N ≥ n for which the proportion of the
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instances i ≤ N of the problem P which are correctly solved by A is greater than
1 − ε:
(
)
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & A(ω, i) = sP,i }
∀ε > 0 ∀n ∃N N ≥ n &
>1−ε .
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP }
Comment. The restriction to suﬃciently long inputs N ≥ n makes perfect sense:
for short inputs, NP-completeness is not an issue: we can perform exhaustive
search of all possible bit sequences of length 10, 20, and even 30. The challenge
starts when the length of the input is high.
Proposition 2. For every NP-complete problem P, there exists a feasible phalgorithm A that solves almost all instances of P.
In other words, we show that the use of physical observations makes all NPcomplete problems easier-to-solve (in the above-described sense).
Acknowledgments. This work was supported in part by the National Science
Foundation grants HRD-0734825, HRD-124212, and DUE-0926721. The authors
are thankful to the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions.
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A

A Formal Definition of Definable Sets

Definition A1. Let L be a theory, and let P (x) be a formula from the language
of the theory L, with one free variable x for which the set {x | P (x)} is deﬁned
in the theory L. We will then call the set {x | P (x)} L-deﬁnable.
Crudely speaking, a set is L-deﬁnable if we can explicitly deﬁne it in L. The set
of all real numbers, the set of all solutions of a well-deﬁned equation, every set
that we can describe in mathematical terms: all these sets are L-deﬁnable.
This does not mean, however, that every set is L-deﬁnable: indeed, every
L-deﬁnable set is uniquely determined by formula P (x), i.e., by a text in the
language of set theory. There are only denumerably many words and therefore,
there are only denumerably many L-deﬁnable sets. Since, e.g., in a standard
model of set theory ZF, there are more than denumerably many sets of integers,
some of them are thus not L-deﬁnable.
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Our objective is to be able to make mathematical statements about Ldeﬁnable sets. Therefore, in addition to the theory L, we must have a stronger
theory M in which the class of all L-deﬁnable sets is a set – and it is a countable
set.
Denotation. For every formula F from the theory L, we denote its Gödel number by ⌊F ⌋.
Comment. A Gödel number of a formula is an integer that uniquely determines
this formula. For example, we can deﬁne a Gödel number by describing what this
formula will look like in a computer. Speciﬁcally, we write this formula in LATEX,
interpret every LATEX symbol as its ASCII code (as computers do), add 1 at
the beginning of the resulting sequence of 0s and 1s, and interpret the resulting
binary sequence as an integer in binary code.
Definition A2. We say that a theory M is stronger than L if it contains all
formulas, all axioms, and all deduction rules from L, and also contains a special predicate def(n, x) such that for every formula P (x) from L with one free
variable, the formula ∀y (def(⌊P (x)⌋, y) ↔ P (y)) is provable in M.
The existence of a stronger theory can be easily proven: indeed, for L=ZF, there
exists a stronger theory M. As an example of such a stronger theory, we can simply take the theory L plus all countably many equivalence formulas as described
in Deﬁnition A2 (corresponding to all possible formulas P (x) with one free variable). This theory clearly contains L and all the desired equivalence formulas,
so all we need to prove is that the resulting theory M is consistent (provided
that L is consistent, of course). Due to compactness principle, it is suﬃcient to
prove that for an arbitrary ﬁnite set of formulas P1 (x), . . . , Pm (x), the theory L
is consistent with the above reﬂection-principle-type formulas corresponding to
these properties P1 (x), . . . , Pm (x).
This auxiliary consistency follows from the fact that for such a ﬁnite set, we
can take
def(n, y) ↔ (n = ⌊P1 (x)⌋ & P1 (y)) ∨ . . . ∨ (n = ⌊Pm (x)⌋ & Pm (y)).
This formula is deﬁnable in L and satisﬁes all m equivalence properties. The
statement is proven.
Important comments. In the main text, we will assume that a theory M that is
stronger than L has been ﬁxed; proofs will mean proofs in this selected theory M.
An important feature of a stronger theory M is that the notion of an Ldeﬁnable set can be expressed within the theory M: a set S is L-deﬁnable if and
only if ∃n ∈ IN ∀y(def(n, y) ↔ y ∈ S).
In the chapter, when we talk about deﬁnability, we will mean this property
expressed in the theory M. So, all the statements involving deﬁnability become
statements from the theory M itself, not statements from metalanguage.
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Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. Let us ﬁx an integer C. To prove the desired property
for this C, let us prove that the set T of all the sequences which do not satisfy this
property, i.e., for which K(α1 . . . αn | ω) ≥ K(α1 . . . αn )−C for all n, is a physical
theory in the sense of Deﬁnition 1. For this, we need to prove that this set T
is non-empty, closed, nowhere dense, and deﬁnable. Then, from Deﬁnition 2, it
will follow that the sequence ω does not belong to this set and thus, that the
conclusion of Proposition 1 is true.
The set T is clearly non-empty: it contains, e.g., a sequence ω = 00 . . . 0 . . .
which does not aﬀect computations. The set T is also clearly deﬁnable: we have
just deﬁned it.
Let us prove that the set T is closed. For that, let us assume that ω (m) → ω
and ω (m) ∈ T for all m. We then need to prove that ω ∈ T . Indeed, let us
ﬁx n, and let us prove that K(α1 . . . αn | ω) ≥ K(α1 . . . αn ) − C. We will prove
this by contradiction. Let us assume that K(α1 . . . αn | ω) < K(α1 . . . αn ) − C.
This means that there exists a program p of length len(p) < K(α1 . . . αn ) − C
which uses ω to compute α1 . . . αn . This program uses only ﬁnitely many bits
of ω; let B be the largest index of these bits. Due to ω (m) → ω, there exists
M for which, for all m ≥ M , the ﬁrst B bits of ω (m) coincide with the ﬁrst B
bits of the sequence ω. Thus, the same program p will work exactly the same
way – and generate the same sequence α1 . . . αn – if we use ω (m) instead of ω.
But since len(p) < K(α1 . . . αn ) − C, this would means that the shortest length
K(α1 . . . αn | ω (m) ) of all the programs which use ω (m) to compute α1 . . . αn also
satisﬁes the inequality K(α1 . . . αn | ω (m) ) < K(α1 . . . αn ) − C. This inequality
contradicts to our assumption that ω (m) ∈ T and thus, that K(α1 . . . αn | ω (m) ) ≥
K(α1 . . . αn ) − C. The contradiction proves that the set T is indeed closed.
Let us now prove that the set T is nowhere dense, i.e., that for every ﬁnite sequence ω1 . . . ωm , there exists a continuation ω which does not belong
to the set T . Indeed, as such a continuation, we can simply take a sequence
ω = ω1 . . . ωm α1 α2 . . . obtained by appending α at the end. For this new sequence, computing α1 . . . αn is straightforward: we just copy the values αi from
the corresponding places of the new sequence ω. Here, the relative Kolmogorov
complexity K(α1 . . . αn | ω) is very small and is, thus, much smaller than the
complexity K(α1 . . . αn ) which – since ZF is not decidable – grows with n.
The proposition is proven.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1◦ . As the desired ph-algorithm, we will, given an instance i, simply produce
the result ωi of the i-th experiment. Let us prove, by contradiction, that this
algorithm satisﬁes the desired property.
2◦ . We want to prove that for every ε > 0 and for every n, there exists an integer
N ≥ n for which
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & ωi = sP,i } > (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP }.
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The assumption that this property is not satisﬁed means that for some ε > 0
and for some integer n, we have
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & ωi = sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP } for all N ≥ n. (1)
Let T denote the set of all the sequences x that satisfy the property (1), i.e.,
let

def

T =

{x : #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP } for all N ≥ n}.
We will prove that this set T is a physical theory in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.
Then, due to Deﬁnition 2 and the fact that the sequence ω satisﬁes the noperfect-theory principle, we will be able to conclude that ω ̸∈ T , and thus, that
the property (1) is not satisﬁed for the given sequence ω. This will conclude the
proof by contradiction.
3◦ . By deﬁnition of a physical theory T , it is a set which is non-empty, closed,
nowhere dense, and deﬁnable. Let us prove these four properties one by one.
3.1◦ . Non-emptiness comes from the fact that the sequence xi for which xi =
¬sP,i for i ∈ SP and xi = 0 otherwise clearly belongs to this set: for this
sequence, for every N , we have #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } = 0 and thus, the
desired property is satisﬁed.
3.2◦ . Let us prove that the set T is closed, i.e., that if we have a family of
sequences x(m) ∈ T for which x(m) → x, then x ∈ T .
Indeed, let us take any N ̸= n, and let us prove that
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP }
for this N . Due to x(m) → x, there exists M for which, for all m ≥ M , the ﬁrst
(m)
N bits of x(m) coincide with the ﬁrst N bits of the sequence x: xi = ωi for all
i ≤ N . Thus,
(m)

#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } = #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi

= sP,i }.

Since x(m) ∈ T , we have
(m)

#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi

= sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP },

thus
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP }.
So, the set T is indeed closed.
◦

3.3 . Let us now prove that the set T is nowhere dense, i.e., that for every ﬁnite
sequence x1 . . . xm , there exists a continuation x which does not belong to the
set T .
Indeed, as such a continuation, we can simply take a sequence
x = x1 . . . xm xm+1 xm+2 . . .
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where for i > m, we take xi = sP,i if i ∈ SP and xi = 0 otherwise. For this new
sequence, for every N , at most m ﬁrst instances may lead to results diﬀerent
from sP,i , so we have
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } ≥ #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP } − m.
When N → ∞, then #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP } → ∞, so for suﬃciently large N , we
have
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP } − m > (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP },
thus,
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } > (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP },
and we cannot have
#{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP & xi = sP,i } ≤ (1 − ε) · #{i ≤ N : i ∈ SP }.
Therefore, this continuation does not belong to the set T .
3.4◦ . Finally, since the formula (1) explicitly deﬁnes the set T , this set T is
clearly deﬁnable.
So, T is a physical theory, hence ω ̸∈ T , and the proposition is proven.

